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SECTARIANISM IN BALOCHISTAN: LASHKAR-E-JHANGVI VS HAZARA COMMUNITY

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ABSTRACT

The study examines the factors, responsible for the spread of sectarianism in Balochistan with a major concentration on the persecution of the Hazara community by a *Deoband* sectarian outfit; Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ). The research is mostly analytical and comparative; based on both qualitative and quantitative research techniques. The research finds that protection to sectarian organizations like LeJ by the military establishment and the State's indifference had intensified the issue. However, since the introduction of the National Action Plan (2014), some reasonable and effective measures have been taken for the safety of Hazaras. Still, a lot is required to be done to assimilate Hazaras in the society and to revive the culture of religious tolerance in Balochistan, Pakistan.

Disciplinary: Multidisciplinary (Social Engineering, Peace and Conflict Studies, World Studies/History; Psychology).

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1. INTRODUCTION

This paper studies the phenomenon of sectarian violence in the province of Balochistan with a major emphasis on persecution of the Hazara community. It suggests that this persecution is happening in the backdrop of increasing immunity to intolerance and less or no religious harmony. This study is an attempt to highlight the issue while focusing on one small community, Hazara Shia of Quetta, as prey and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) as their predator. The in-depth study of this type would, hopefully, help us in understanding the phenomenon of sectarian violence in Balochistan fully and completely. The reason for focusing on the sufferings of the Hazara community of Balochistan is that it is facing a major assault by LeJ as claimed by LeJ leadership on many occasions. Secondly, academia has largely ignored this subject. The study also highlights the types of violence and methods, utilized therein against the Hazara community. The research has found that targeted-killing and general attacks on the small but religious Hazara community have created psychological issues among their brilliant and hard-working youngsters specifically and the rest of the community generally. In addition, the study intends to highlight the steps taken by various regimes to ameliorate

the issue. It has explored that some initial half-hearted efforts were made to resolve the issue which was followed by a few successful steps for its resolution, however, the issue remains and it calls for more serious steps. The study is based on mostly qualitative research supported by a partial resort to quantitative research methods.

2. BALOCHISTAN: INITIAL HARMONY AND ORIGIN OF SECTARIANISM

Balochistan constitutes 43% of Pakistan’s territory and only 5% of its population. The Baloch and Pashtun constitute 85 percent of the population whereas the rest 15 percent includes Brahuīs, Punjabis, Sindhis, and Hazaras (Sidiqi, 2015). Sunnis, in Pakistan, generally constitute 70-75% of the population, while Shias comprise 15-20% (Malik, 2002). However, exact figures are not available.

Balochistan, for centuries, has been traditionally known for its secular conventions. There were no signs of sectarian or religious rivalries. The Balochis had remained more concerned about their Baloch identity and tribal affiliations than with religious identities. Unfortunately, the State’s policies since Zia ul Haq’s regime have gradually transformed the historical co-existence on a religious basis into antagonism against each other’s belief systems. Islam was used as a political tool by the Zia regime and Islamist parties were introduced, for the first time in the province to counter-balance the nationalist parties (Notezai, 2017). Besides opening a chain of *Deoband Madrassas* in the province (Hussain, 2018). The pupils of these religious seminaries could then be trained and produced in the mental mold of the federal government’s version of Islam. Thus the seeds of sectarianism were sown in the province. Zia regime’s policies were continued by future governments and especially by the military regime of Musharraf with even greater zeal and vigor. Musharraf regime specifically focused on the Baloch belt of the province which was traditionally against mullah culture. Ministry of Religious Affairs opened a lot of new *Deoband Madrassas* in this belt to transform the younger generation of Baloch tribes (Grare, 2013). There were only 169 Madrassas in the province in 1979, which rose to 347 in 1988.

Table 1: Madrassas of various sects in Balochistan, for 1979 and 1988.

Year	Students	Deoband	Barelvi	Ahl-e Hadis	Shia	Others/Unknown	Total
1979	-	20	14	-	-	135	169*
1988	40390	278	34	3	1	31	347**

*Source: Government of Pakistan Report on Madrassas Annexure-14.

**Tariq Rahman, “Madrassas in Pakistan: A Phenomenal Growth,” *Dawn*, 10 April 2000.

However, the number of *Madrassas* in Balochistan, by 2015-16 compared to the pre 9/11 era has been figured out in Table 2.

Table 2: Madrassas in Balochistan, 2015-16

Madrassa Board	Male	Female	Mixed	Total
Rabita-tul-Madaris Islamia	58	8	115	181
Wafaq-ul-Madaris	325	29	423	777
Tanzeem-ul-Madaris	132	12	316	460
Other Bodies	41	12	127	180
Not Affiliated	292	49	826	1167
Not Reported	78	4	112	194
Total	926	114	1919	2959

Source: Pakistan Education Statistics, 2015-16, National Education Management System, Academy of Educational Planning and Management, Ministry of Federal Education and Professional Training, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.

Table 2 shows that the total number of *Madrassas*, representing various schools of thought, has been raised to two thousand nine hundred and fifty-nine. This rise of *madrassa* has a great impact on

expanding the culture of sectarianism in the province as almost all of them are imparting education on sectarian lines.

The religious outfits achieved prominence in the region following the 2002 elections when they entered into a coalition government with the PML (Q). Following that, they expanded their religious militant proxies as part of their strategy. Table 3 helps in understanding the strong party-position of Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal Pakistan (MMA) in the Balochistan Assembly and later in a coalition set up.

Table 3: Party Position in Balochistan Assembly, Elections 2002.

Party	General Seats	Women Seats	Non-Muslim Seats
Pakistan Muslim League (Q)	15	04	01
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal Pakistan	14	03	01
National Alliance	05	01	01
Balochistan National Movement	03	01	--
Jamhoori Wattan Party	03	01	--
Pakistan Peoples Party	02	01	--
Balochistan National Party	02	--	--
Pakhtoonkhawa Milli Awami Party	02	--	--
Independents	01	--	--

Source: www.electionpakistani.com

There is a strong perception among politically powerless communities of Balochistan that sectarianism has been used by the military establishment to the counter-balance liberation movement of Baloch nationalists and that LeJ has continuously been used as a tool by the military establishment. An eye-witness of a major target-killing of Hazaras in 2014 revealed that only two Hazara pilgrims could survive out of the target-killing of an entire pilgrims-bus. The eye-witness further revealed that the survivors stated that the assailants were not civilians, but they were wearing the uniform of security forces. They thus obviously perceived that the security forces were involved in killing them (Hassan, 2019).

The next important reason for the spread of extremism and sectarianism in Balochistan is the regional factor. Balochistan has a 1200 km long border with Afghanistan and a 909 km long border with Iran. Thousands of Afghans including people of extremist inclinations had migrated and settled in the province over the years since 1979 (Notezai, 2017). Iran also established a cultural center in Quetta to spread its influence among the growing Shia population of the region. The Iranian consulate in Quetta remained active in supporting Hazaras (Dedalus, Summer 2009). Balochistan has continuously been used as grounds for ideological war by the two countries.

International involvement for destabilizing Pakistan and Balochistan is difficult to avoid. The proxy-war between Iran and Saudi Arabia and sometimes the State's role as a Party to this war has transformed a religiously harmonious society into a ground for sectarian killings. Hazaras are considered as agents of Iran. Some of them suggest that Hazaras exaggerate their plight to get financial and political help from Iran. Some local inhabitants consider that Hazaras themselves are responsible for their isolation to some extent as they always lived in segregated localities even before the start of sectarian killings (Saprah, 2019).

The last but not least perception of sectarianism in Balochistan suggests that ethnicity may have its justification. Hazaras are not indigenous settlers, and the LeJ's local leadership is predominantly Baloch who are targeting majorly Shia Hazaras and not Baloch Shias (Dedalus, 2009a). This argument may be a solid one with regards to killings of the past few years. Hazara community also

perceives that their prosperity and their control of the local business in Quetta might be another reason for their target-killing.

3. HAZARA COMMUNITY: ORIGIN, MIGRATION, AND SETTLEMENT IN BALOCHISTAN

Hazaras are a small ethnic Shia mass of the population who originally belong to Hazarajat, (Rajan, 2015). The central mountainous region of Afghanistan and they have relatively smaller concentrations in Iran and Pakistan. However, it is one of the largest communities in the urban center of Quetta (Monsutti, 2005). The first-ever mention of the Hazara community in the historical text is found in *Baburnama*. Emperor Babur has written that the time his army left Kabul, it was attacked by the Hazaras (Babur, 2002). It is believed that Hazaras were converted to Shia faith in the 16th century under the Safavid dynasty in Persia. They remained a target of persecution under the larger Sunni ruling class in Afghanistan for centuries. Table 4 clarifies various waves of migration of Hazara community from Afghanistan to Balochistan, mostly Quetta:

Table 4: Statistics of Hazara Community’s Migration from Afghanistan to Balochistan

Waves of Migration	Ratio of Migrants	Factors of Migration
1878-1891	Few hundred	Seeking employment
1891-1901	Mass migration	Subjugation by Amir Abdur Rehman.
1901-1933	Minor/scattered	Seeking employment in the Hazara Regiment of the colonial government.
1933-1971	Further scattered and minor	Hazara regiment disbanded and comparative peace in Hazarajat.
1971-1978	Constant but medium-sized	The long drought in Hazarajat
1979-1996	Continuous in a reasonable number	Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.
1996-2001	Large-scale	Persecution of Hazaras by the Taliban Regime.

Source: Table 4 has been prepared by the author on the basis of the information collected through various books and reports. Nabi in Banuazizi and Weiner, (Ed.), 1987: 128

They are currently living in Nawabshah, Sanghar, Parachinar, Karachi, Hyderabad, scattered parts of Punjab and Gilgit-Baltistan besides major concentration in Quetta and other parts of Balochistan. They had been awarded the status of citizens of Pakistan in 1962 only (Hassan, 2012). Two political parties, Hazara Democratic Party (HDP) and Majlis Wahdat-e-Muslimeen (MWM), are currently representing their community in the political arena. MWM won one seat in the provincial assembly in 2013 elections and HDP in the 2018 elections. HDP is a liberal Party and wants co-existence of all communities in Balochistan whereas MWM is striving for pan-Shiaism. The total population of Shia Hazara is 0.4-0.5 million out of 12,344,408 population of Balochistan. Further, Hazaras neither have any secessionist agenda nor any revolutionary program (Notezai, 2017). They are generally hardworking and intelligent people with a scholarly aptitude. Their literary services were multifarious in the past. They excelled in the fields of sports, scholarship and civil bureaucracy before the start of their persecution; about twenty years ago. The presence of a reasonable number of Hazara women in educational institutions is proof of their liberal approach towards females in the conservative society of Balochistan. This study finds, however, that now the situation is different, and Hazaras are mostly introvert and traumatized due to constant oppression or fear of terrorism. They are unable to shine in various fields, unlike in the past due to panic, and resultant ghettoize in two areas of Quetta, even for educational and business activities. This perception has been developed on the basis of interviews, conducted by the researchers.

4. LASKHAR-E-JHANGVI: AN OVERVIEW

LeJ is the main extremist religious group behind open and severe persecution of Shias generally and of the Hazara community specifically (Siddiqi, 2015). It is a breakaway faction of SSP, which was established in 1996 by Malik Is'haq in coordination with Riaz Basra and Muhammad Ajmal known as Akram Lahori (Report, 2006). It was named after their slain leader Maulana Huq Nawaz Jhangvi (Gazdar, 2016).

Initially, it had the support of the Pakistan military as it was active in Kashmir *Jihad* and was supporting the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The situation changed after 9/11, and it was banned by Musharraf in 2002. The banning did not have much impact on the working of the organization and it continued operating in South Punjab, Balochistan and some parts of KPK and areas of former FATA (Mahmood, 2015). However, its stance changed and it started cooperating with TTP and even with al-Qaeda. It started targeting Pakistan security forces in later years and emerged as a terrorist group.

As far as its religious ideologies and leaning are concerned, it is Sunni *Deobandi* and extremely intolerant towards other religious factions or creeds. It is specifically extremely anti-Shia and considers Shias as heretics who deserve to be killed. It is usually notified outside the gates of the mosques of LeJ/SSP in Jhang that 'the entry of a dog and a Shia is prohibited in the mosque.' (Khattak, 2013). It wants to 'purify' land of Pakistan from 'impure Shias.'

LeJ has proved to be the main contender against Hazaras as it is involved in a large number of target-killing and bombing attacks (Chandran et al, 2015). Some attacks had been materialized in collaboration with TTP also. LeJ is further working in different areas with other sub-names such as Lashkar-e-Difah in Turbat, (Reza, 2019). Jaish-ul-Islam, Al-Alami, and Jama'at-ul-Ahrar, etc. to give the impression that various sectarian organizations are working against Shias in Balochistan. LeJ reorganized itself in 2010 and introduced eight small cells throughout Pakistan to execute its plan more appropriately (Pamphlet of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi,).

Unlike the earlier leadership of LeJ, the later one was Balochistan-born and was trained in Afghanistan-based training camps, established and operated by Riaz Basra and other leadership of LeJ. This cadre of Baloch leadership included Usman Saifullah Kurd, Dawood Badini, and Shafiq Rind. Their return from the training camps was the real end of harmony in the peaceful land of Balochistan (Dedalus, 45).

5. PERSECUTION OF HAZARA COMMUNITY AND POLICY OF THE STATE

This part of the paper sees methods, styles, and levels of persecution of the Hazara community and policy of the State in a parallel way. The tide of sectarian killing or vulnerability of the Hazara community can be divided into three phases depending both on the intensity of maltreatment and the State's policy.

The major persecution of Hazaras is the prevalence of constant fear. They spend their lives in the vicinity of Quetta in fright. Many of them are affected by mental diseases of trauma and others. Their free movement is possible only in areas of their concentration, i.e. Hazara Town and Mariabad (Ahmad, 2012). Their children cannot go to schools freely and safely in areas other than these two locations. No public hospital is available in their areas, and they are fearful of going to other parts of the city. Fear is so visible and constant that they try to conceal their original identities. They even

claim themselves as Uzbeks when asked. The economic plight of the community is increasing rapidly besides fear. Hazaras were prosperous, but now the situation is changed. Now their major business activity is restricted to their areas of concentration only, and they have only fewer chances of business. The worst kind of brutality and violence, Hazaras have to face, is target-killing of various kinds and killings through suicide-bombings.

5.1 FIRST PHASE OF INTIMIDATION: 1999-2008

The first phase of intimidation of Hazaras was from 1999 to 2008. The wave started with the attack on Sardar Nisar Ali, MPA, from the Hazara community. The situation, however, worsened after 9/11. In 2003, Hazara Shias were massacred in Quetta. LeJ's literature and *fatawas* of *Deobandi* Ulama, regarding Shias as a heretic, were widely spread in the city before the carnage of Hazaras (Hassan, 2019). Their leaders spoke in the Television talk-shows about plans of LeJ, but no State institution took it seriously. Table 5 shows the killing incidents besides a short description of the events:

Table 5: The Incidents of Hazara-Killing, Musharraf Regime

	Date	Short description of attack:	Killed/injured
1	5 Oct. 1999	Attack on Sardar Nisar, Hazara MPA	2 Killed
2	15 August 2001	Attack on the senior employee of State Bank	1 killed
3	28 August 2001	Attack on Prof. Abid Abbas Naqvi.	1 killed
4	13 September 2001	Attack on Prof. Attiq Naqvi	1 killed/1 injured.
5	17 March 2002	Attack on a senior custom officer	1 killed
6	8 June 2003	Attack on police cadets	25 killed
7	2 July 2003	Attack on Hazara recruits of police	25 killed
8	4 July 2003	Attack on Shia Imam bargah	53 killed/57 injured
9	2 March 2004	Attack on Muharram procession	60 Killed/100 injured

Source: Table 5 has been prepared by the author on the basis of the information collected through various books, reports, and newspapers.

Prominent Hazara citizens, working on various important portfolios including professors, bureaucrats, MPA, etc. were generally killed in this phase. A new trend of the general killing of Hazaras, while attacking religious monasteries of Shias, was materialized in 2003. The years between 2006 and 2008 observed comparative peace with reference to Hazara killings. Unfortunately, the police or other security agencies besides the government did not take any action except condemnation of the events. Some so-called culprits were arrested only to be released after two or three days (Noor, 2012). The provincial government of Balochistan also extended protection to sectarian leaders during the military regime of Musharraf as such parties were part of Musharraf's governmental set-up at the Centre and in the provinces. Ironically, Usman Saifullah Kurd, Operational Commander of LeJ, Balochistan Chapter, and his associate Badini escaped Quetta Prison on 18 January 2008, which was located in a high-security zone and no one could enter there without a pass. Such practices were a big question mark on the capabilities of security and law enforcement agencies (Hassan, 2019).

5.2 SECOND PHASE: 2009-2014

The second phase started in 2009 with the killing of the Chairman of the HDP, and it continued till 2014: it ended with the introduction of the 21st amendment in the Constitution (Vakil, 2019). During this period, around 600 individuals had been killed, and around 700 had been injured in various incidents mostly in Quetta (Hussain, 2018). It was largely Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) regime at the Centre with coalition set up in Balochistan. Table 6 further clarifies the situation.

Table 6: The Incidents of Hazara-Killing, PPP Regime.

Date	Short description of attacks: PPP Regime	Killed/Injured
1 January 2009	Attack on President of HDP	1 killed
2 August-October 2009	4 targeted-attacks on prominent Hazara citizens	4 killed
3 12 January 2010	Suicide bombing attack on the hospital at the occasion of treatment of injured Hazara	12 killed/47 injured
4 22 May 2010	Attack on a physician	2 killed
5 3 September 2010	Suicide bombing attack on a procession of Imamia Student Federation	56 killed/10 injured
6 30 July 2011	Attack on a Hazara Wan	11 killed/3 injured
7 31 August 2011	Attack on Imam Bargah on Eid prayer	11 killed/13 injured
8 19 September 2011	Attack on Shia pilgrim bus	26 killed
9 4 October 2011	Attack on a Shia Hazara bus	13 killed/6 injured
10 9 April 2012	Attack on Hazara shops	6 killed
11 15 May 2012	Attack on Hazara outside of post office	2 killed/1 injured
12 18 June 2012	Attack on a Shia Hazara bus	4 killed/72 injured
13 1 September 2012	Attack on vegetable sellers	7 killed
14 20 September 2012	Attack on Shia pilgrim bus	3 killed/12 injured
15 4 October 2012	Attack on an employee of Finance Ministry	1 killed
16 16 October 2012	Attack on a Hazara Shop	4 killed
17 6 November 2012	Attack on a Hazara Shop	3 killed
18 10 November 2012	Road attack on Hazaras	2 killed
19 10 January 2013	Snooker club attack	96 killed/150 injured
20 17 February 2013	A remote control bomb explosion on Hazara vegetable market	84 killed/21 injured

Source: Table 6 has been prepared by the author on the basis of the information collected through various books, reports, and newspapers. There were a few other incidents besides the above mentioned. (Dawn 11 January 2013)

Some new trends in killings of Hazaras, such as attacks on Shia pilgrim buses, Hazara shops, and common people moving on roads had been introduced besides already prevailing styles of killing. Above all, suicide bombing attacks on big gatherings of Hazaras were the bleakest aspect of the killing of common citizens of Pakistan. The ratio of the killing of Hazaras and the number of attacks remained very high during this period. Hazara-killing reached its highest level in 2013. The years 2012 and 2013 are considered as worst years in this regard.

The issue was discussed and debated in the National Assembly. Usman Khan, Advocate, MNA said that the coalition cabinet of Balochistan had included criminals and gangsters. January 2013 snooker club suicide bombing attack was the worst one. The Hazara community started a sit-in until justice was assured to them, and their co-brothers in the whole of Pakistan started demonstrations against the government. The PPP government only then had to yield to the demand, and Prime Minister Raja Pervaz Ashraf announced for the imposition of Governor's Rule in the presence of Hazara Shia leadership on 12 January 2013. It proved to be an insufficient measure as no improvement was observed in the law and order situation even after that. The leaders of opposition parties demanded, on the floor of the House, to arrest all culprits especially leaders of LeJ, who openly had accepted the responsibility for the attacks.

Police and intelligence agencies failed badly besides Anti-terrorism courts. Neither any culprit was arrested nor was operation clean-up materialized against any sectarian outfit or sectarian-killer like Is'haq (Ahmed, 2011). Reza Vakil, Senior Vice President of HDP shared that the President of their Party met with the President of Pakistan during his visit to Quetta in February 2013 and requested to take some effective measures for the protection of the Hazara community. Unfortunately, the president took that request in the lighter mood and said that he and his forefathers had given many sacrifices but remained patient. Hazaras should also forbear the circumstances. Whereas the president while talking to media, stated, "the fight against militant and sectarian mindset may be hard and long but will not rest till we have defeated this enemy of the state and the country."

Although some general measures to improve security such as banning *rahdaris*, displaying arms, using tinted glasses, etc., had been introduced under the President's instructions, yet no specified operation had been started by the provincial or national government (Business Recorder 2013.)

LeJ had remained helpful to the military in its cause of Jihad on required fronts, so small-level operations had not proved to be fruitful. Mir Zubair Mehmood, a capital city police officer shared that police itself had remained a target of LeJ and was mostly unable to control its actions (Dedalus, 2009b). The counter-terrorism approach of the State remained selective during that period. Operations had not been materialized indiscriminately against all terrorist groups. Despite LeJ's open acceptance of the killing of Hazaras, no effective measures were taken by the State against its culprits.

5.3 THIRD PHASE, 2014 TO DATE

The third phase in the history of Hazara's intimidation started in 2014 and continued to date. It was MLN's regime, followed by Tehrik-i-Insaf in 2018. The situation was gradually brought under control while introducing some severe and specified steps to overcome the crisis in the province. As major concentrations of Hazaras are in Hazara town and Mariabad on Alamdar Road in Quetta, so some measure like establishment of permanent check-posts at entry and exit points of these areas, construction of high-security walls around their colonies, appointment of 19 platoons of FC personal in Mariabad and Hazara town, appointment of patrolling police in the areas of common movement of Hazaras, have been introduced for their protection. (2012). Secondly, the road from Quetta to Taftan, Iran and back, for Shia pilgrims, has been made safe.

The federal government passed an amendment in the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 in June 2014. The purpose of the amendment was to make security agencies more powerful to deal with sectarian and terrorist outfits and to make the existence of such organizations more difficult in Pakistan. Previously, Pakistan's criminal justice system had only a five to ten percent rate of conviction. However, targeting military and other security personnel by various groups in Balochistan had created the realization that the extremists were against the security agencies also. The new situation had helped the agencies to re-design the policy.

Nonetheless, some developments had been observed in dealing with LeJ in Balochistan in 2015 and 2016. On account of weak and dubious court procedures in Pakistan, the government of Nawaz Sharif established military courts for a period of two years to deal with the cases related to terrorism and sectarianism under the 21st amendment in the constitution. It was clearly mentioned that all such culprits, arrested on the basis of sectarian or religious violence or on the act of terrorism would be treated in the Military courts. It was after the establishment of military courts that some improvements had been observed in dealing with such cases and around three hundred terrorists were awarded the death sentence including Akram Lahori of LeJ; he was hanged in January 2015. Malik Is'haq with thirteen other major hard-core leaders of LeJ was killed in a gunfight with the police in July 2015. Earlier Usman Kurd, leader of Baloch faction had been killed in February 2015 in Quetta by Frontier Corps. These developments were considered a major blow to the operational capabilities of LeJ, Balochistan. Qari Ismail alias Ahmed, who confessed to being involved in fifteen cases of target-killing, had been arrested in May 2018, and three of its major leaders including Salman Badini, the head of LeJ, were killed in the same month.

PM Nawaz Sharif's government had established, prior to the 21st amendment, such a political government in Balochistan which also served the purpose of a broader level of peace. Besides, it's

National Action Plan (NAP) (Fayyaz, 2008). Also supported the security agencies to overcome bad law and order situation in Balochistan. It included non-military measures such as banning of extremist *Madrassas* and sectarian outfits, controlling financial means of terrorist groups, ban on hate-speech against ethnic minorities, etc. In spite of the constant efforts of the government, persecution of the Hazara community, though with less intensity, continued during the whole regime as is described in Table 7.

Table 7: The Incidents of Hazara-Killing, PML (N) Regime

	Date	Short description of attacks: PML (N) Regime	Killed/Injured
1	2 January 2014	Attack on pilgrims bus	30 killed/21 injured
2	12 April 2014	Road attack on Hazaras	2 killed
3	9 June 2014	Attack on Hazara pilgrims in a hotel	30 killed
4	23 October 2014	Attack on a Hazara bus	8 killed/6 injured
5	25 May 2015	Two Road attacks	4 killed/9 injured
6	7 June 2015	Road attack	5 killed
7	5 July 2015	Attack on the post office	2 killed
8	6 November 2015	Road attack	2 killed/2 injured
9	1 August 2016	Attack on Hazaras in a rickshaw	2 killed
10	4 October 2016	Attack on a bus	4 Hazara women killed/dozens injured.
11	8 December 2016	Road attack	1 killed
12	5 January 2017	Attack on a taxi with Hazara passengers	5 injured
13	3 June 2017	Attack on Ph. D scholars	2 killed
14	23 June 2017	Road attack	2 killed
15	19 July 2017	Attack on a car of Hazara family	4 killed
16	1 August 2017	Road attack	2 killed
17	10 September 2017	Attack on a car of Hazara family	4 killed/2 injured
18	16 September 2017	Attack on a car of Hazara family	No casualty
19	9 October 2017	Attack on Hazara vegetable sellers	5 killed/1 injured
20	20 October 2017	Attack on Hazara labors	1 killed
21	April 2018	4 attacks on shopkeepers and others	6 killed
22	11 April 2019	Attack on Hazarganji Market	20 killed/48 injured

Source: Table 7 has been prepared by the author on the basis of the information collected through various books, reports, and newspapers.

Overall, security arrangements have been improved for the said community in Quetta, but protecting Hazaras in their specified areas of concentration have resulted in general feeling among them that they had been ghettoized unnecessarily (Hassan, 2012). They want broader and long-term actions for their protection. Despite various steps of the government, occasional incidents of killing Hazaras are observed. The latest attack on them was observed on 12 April 2019, in which sixteen people, mostly vegetable vendors, were killed. Ramazan Mengal, LeJ leader, had been released by the police only two days earlier than the Friday violence regardless of Mengal's confession of murdering many Hazaras and grave charges of human rights contraventions. Such actions are a big question mark on the seriousness and faithfulness of the authorities to settle the issue.

6. CONCLUSION

Overall, the State's policy of divide and rule for Balochistan needs a radical shift. In place of divide and rule, positive measures should be introduced to overcome the wave of sectarianism in the province. It is quite unfortunate that *Jihad* and sectarianism have become intermingled in Pakistan. Although military establishment supports *Jihadi* organizations for the purpose of *Jihad* in Kashmir and Afghanistan, when the same is involved in sectarianism; the establishment, the military, and intelligence agencies usually turn a blind eye on their activities. However, in the case of Balochistan, besides this factor, sectarian outfits had been supported by the establishment to counter the nationalist

forces also. It cannot be claimed that the military had always been part of the anti-Hazara activities or involved in their killings, nonetheless, it has sometimes facilitated or ignored the activities of militant outfits to achieve its other objectives. The strong entrenchment of Taliban, robust LeJ and establishment of MMA's government in the province during the Musharraf regime were the factors due to which sectarianism experienced a drastic upswing. The issue inherited to the succeeding civilian regime.

Unfortunately, the PPP regime (2008-2013) also could not solve the issue except taking some scattered steps like a dismissal of the government or imposition of the Governor's Rule. However, some result-oriented and long-term measures had been introduced by ML (N)'s government (2013-2018). The policy measures such as the establishment of military courts, construction of high-security walls in areas of Hazara concentration, killing of Malik Is'haq, and other hard-core leadership of LeJ in police encounters and implementation of National Action Plan have provided some solid results. Existence in a society without integrating with the other communities is not a good example of mutual survival so some broader and long-term measures should be taken by the State to settle the issue, which requires services of the military, state institutions, provincial and national governments, and civil society alike to create a society of co-existence and tolerance once again. It is the time to create general awareness about tolerance and forbearance besides controlling sectarian outfits and mushrooming of sectarian *Madrassas*.

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